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·Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the ·
Unionized Workplace: Is .Bargaining with the
Union Required?
ANN c. HODGES*
Jn' Wright v. Universal Maritime Se~ice Corp., 1 the Supreme Court held
that a union waiver of an emplOyee~s right to a judicial forum for a statutory
cause of action must be clear·and unequivocal. 2 While I have argued that the
,

,

*Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author thanks Professor Matthew
Finkin, Professor Martin Malin, arid Paul M. Thompson, Hunton & Williams, for
valuable coniments on earlier drafts. In addition, the article'benefited from the input of
the participants at the OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION Symposium 2000
and the participants at the University of Richmond Faculty and John Marshall Scholars
Colloquy. Michele D. Henry and Cindy L. Press,ley, Class of 2001, University of
Richmond, provided valuable research assistance. Any errors herein are attributable to
the author.
1 Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 52S U.S. 70 (1998).
2 Id. at 80. While the requirement that a waiver be clear and unequivocal is a
necessary prerequisite to precluding judicial litigation, it is not necessarily sufficient. A
court might also require that the individual lmowingly waive the right. See Jan William
Stumer, Arbitration, Labor Contracts, anil the ADA: the Benefits of Pre-Dispute

Arbitration Agreements and an Update on the Conflict Between the Duty to
Accommodate and Seniority Rights, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 455, 485 (1999).
Some level of fairness and perhaps rough equivalence to the judicial process might also
be required. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)
(refusing to compel employee to arbitrate because Hooters breached the agreement "by
promulgating rules so egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete default of its
contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do so in good faith." Among the
unfair rules cited by the court were the requirement that the arbitrators be selected from a
panel chosen exclusively by Hooters; a requirement that the employee, but not Hooters,
give notice of the claim, its basis, all witnesses, and their testimony; and a provision that
Hooters, but not the employee, could challenge the arbitration decision in court); Cole v.
Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims because it provided for neutral arbitrators, more than minimal
discovery, a written award, all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in
court, and employer payment of fees and costs. The court.indicated that it would not
enforce an agreement that required an employee to- pay any of the costs of arbitration to
vindicate a statutory claim). It is likely that the arbitration process under the collective
bargaining agreement would meet most of the fairness or judicial equivalence
requirements imposed by courts to date, with two possible exceptions. Generally, formal
discovery is not available in labor arbitration, although the parties may exchange
information voluntarily during the grievance process or obtain information through the
right to information under the National Labor Relations Act. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL.,
ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 224-26 (2000). In some cases, the collective bargaining
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union should not be permitted to waive the individual employees' rights to a
judicial forum, 3 the Court declined to decide that issue, deeming it
unnecessary for purposes of the case.4 Prior to the Wright decision, only the
Fourth Circuit had held that such a waiver was permissible; since Wright, the
Fourth Circuit has maintained that position, providing guidance as to the
contractual language that would constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver
under Wright. s
Given employer interest in confining employees to the arbitral forum,6
some unionized employers undoubtedly will seek to negotiate language in
the collective bargaining agreement that requires employees to arbitrate their
statutory claims. Alternatively, some unionized employers may seek to
agreement may provide for some discovery or the arbitrator may order discovery. Id. at
225-27. In addition, labor arbitrators have been generally reluctant to award punitive
damages and attorneys' fees. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 589, 592 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).
Indeed, the authority to award punitive damages is in some doubt in the absence of an
express contractual provision authorizing such damages. Id. at 589-90 (noting that courts
disagree regarding the power of arbitrators to award punitive damages in the absence of
contractual authorization). While there has been little litigation of the adequacy of
collectively bargained arbitration procedures for statutory claims, these issues may give
some courts pause. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991 ), specifically sanctioned arbitration of a statutory claim in
the nonunion context where discovery was more limited than in litigation. Id. at 31. The
Gilmer Court also considered the damages limitation issue but decided that the arbitral
rules at bar did not limit available relief. Id. at 32. For further discussion of these issues,
see Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not
Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. REsOL. 589 (2001).
3 See Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The
Fourth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 123 (1998). Should that view ultimately prevail in the Supreme Court, a
union waiver would almost certainly not be a mandatory subject of bargaining; it would
be classified as a permissive or illegal subject. However, even if the union cannot waive
the right, the issue of whether the employer could impose such a waiver on unionized
employees would remain. In addition, the union might demand to bargain over the
arbitration procedure for statutory claims. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int') v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing en bane, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'I, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3756 (Mar. 9.
2000)
(Nos.
98-7196
&
98-7202),
available
at
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/anker.pdf. The judgment in Air Line Pilots
Ass 'n, Int 'I was vacated in response to a petition for rehearing en bane, but on rehearing
the court reinstated the opinion as judgment and opinion of the court en bane. 211 F.3d
1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
4 Wright, 525 U.S. at 82.
5 Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999).
6 See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT9 (1997).
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impose waivers on unionized employees individually without bargaining
with the union.7 A crucial determinant in the success of such efforts will be
whether the arbitration of statutory claims is found to be a mandatory subject
of bargaining. The classification of a subjept as mandatory or permissive
determines whether the negotiating parties can insist to impasse _on inclusion
of a provision in the agreement· and, in most cases, whether the party can
implement the provision upon impasse. In addition, the classification
significantly impacts the question of whether the employer c~ negotiate
individually with employees about a subject.
This article analyzes the question of whether arbitration of statutory
claims should be classified as a mandatory or permissive subject of
bargaining under the National Labor ~elations Act (NLRA). s First, this
article reviews the post-Wright cases that hold that a union-negotiated waiver
is permissible. Second, this article reviews the only decision to consider the
issue of classification of the bargaining subject, Air Line Pilots Ass 'n,
International v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,9 a case arising in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under the Railway Labor
Act.IO In that case, the court concluded that the matter was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining because the union could not lawfully waive the
employees' right to litigate. I I The court went on to hold that the employer
lawfully imposed the arbitration agreements on probationary pilots
individually, rejecting the union's argument .that bargaining with the union
was required.12 Because the D.C. Circuit's opinion was based on its
conclusion that a union waiver is impermissible, I3 this article proceeds to
consider the appropriate analysis under the NLRA if a union waiver is not
prohibited. To answer this question, this article analyzes the case law under
the NLRA on mandatory bargaining subjects. This article concludes that,
although all aspects of the arbitration procedure are mandatory bargaining
subjects, the waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum is not. Having
reached that conclusion, this article goes on to determine whether the
employer, consistent with the NLRA, may impose arbitration agreements
upon individual employees who are represented by a union, with or without
negotiation with the employees. Since statutory arbitration is substantially
intertwined with contractual arbitration due to overlap in the subjects to be
7 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'[, 199 F.3d at485.
8 29 u.s.c. § 151-69 (1994)
9 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'I v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
10 45 u.s.c. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1994).
11 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'[, 199 F.3d at485-86.
I2 Id. at 486.
I3 Id. at 485-86.
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arbitrated, this article concludes that the employer cannot bypass the union
and impose statutory arbitration on the employees directly. Nevertheless,
there remains a role for statutory arbitration in the unionized workplace if the
employer, employees, and union agree that it would be of mutual benefit.

I. ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS IN THE UNIONIZED
WORKPLACE AFTER WRIGHT

Interpreting Wright, the Fourth Circuit has defined two methods by
which a collective bargaining agreement can clearly and unequivocally waive
the right to litigate a statutory claim.14 The collective bargaining agreement's
arbitration clause could provide specifically that employees agree to arbitrate
all federal claims arising out of employment. Alternatively, where the
arbitration clause applies to all disputes, or all disputes concerning the
interpretation of the agreement, the statutory discrimination laws must be
incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement in order to constitute a
waiver. Neither a general antidiscrimination requirement 15 nor contractual
language that "parallel[s], or even parrot[s]" the discrimination statutes is
sufficient to establish a waiver in the Fourth Circuit.16 In addition, an
agreement not to discriminate in violation of the law is not an incorporation
of the discrimination statutes "in their entirety" into the agreement. 17 Courts
in other jurisdictions have followed the Fourth Circuit cases, and with a few
exceptions, courts have declined to find waiver of the right to litigate in a
judicial forum.IS The Wright waiver standard has been applied to state
discrimination law claimsl9 and constitutional claims as well.20
14 Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999). Several other
circuits have concluded either initially, or by reaffirming previously adopted positions,
that such waivers are impermissible as a matter of law. Rogers v. New York University,
220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2000); Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, Int 'I, 199 F.3d at 482.
15 Carson, 175 F.3d at 332.
16 Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 322 (1999).
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 655 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding no waiver where collective bargaining agreement does not mention the statute
and employee's grievance alleging discrimination does not waive right to litigate in
judicial forum, even where arbitrator and employee discuss the statute); Quint v. A.E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1999) (finding no waiver when no contractual
mention of the statute).
!9 Vasquez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 80 Cal. App. 4th 430, 434
(2000).
20 Schumacher v. Souderton Area School Dist., No. CIV.A.99-1515, 2000 WL
72047 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2000).
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Two districts courts, one in the Fourth Circuit and one in the Second,21
have enforced agreements to arbitrate statutory claims based on language in
collective bargaining agreements. The Middle District of North Carolina, in
Safrit v. Cone Mills, 22 found a waiver based on Carson23 and Brown.24 While
the language of the agreement is not quoted_ in the case, the court describes
the language as containing an agreement "not to discriminate against any
employee because of gender and to abide by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Section XX of the CBA requires that any grievance against
Defendant for discrimination must be submitted to arbitration. "25 It is
difficult to tell from the court's description of the language whether it met
either of the requirements articulated in, Carson.
A recent decision from the Eastern District of New York gave preclusive
effect to an arbitrator's decision to deny a sexual harassment grievance,
thereby granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Title VII and state law
claims.26 The court concluded that there was a clear and unmistakable
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims based on a contractual commitment to
end sexual harassment, which included a definition drawn in part from
Supreme Court cases under Title VII, and language in the same provision
stating that grievances under the clause will be handled with speed and
confidentiality.21
These cases demonstrate that the issue of waivers is alive. and well,
despite the Supreme Court's lack of a decisio:i;i on the issue of union authority
or the fact that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wright, the Second,
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had refused to
bar employee lawsuits on the basis of arbitration agreements in collective
·
bargaining contracts.28

21 Since the New York court's decision, however, the Second Circuit has ruled that
union waivers of employee rights to litigate statutory claims are unenforceable. Rogers v.
New York University, 220 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2000).
22 Safrit v. Cone Mills, No. 4:97CV00646, 1999 WL 1111516 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9,
1999), appeal docketed, No. 99-2677 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 1999).
23 Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999)
24 Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319 (1999).
25 Safrit, 1999WL1111516, at *1.
26 See Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
21 [d.
28 See, e.g., Martin v. Dana Corp., 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1997); Penny v. United
Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Company, 109 F.3d
- 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Weber Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir.
1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming on
remand, 158 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1998), its holding that the employee's failure to
arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement did not bar her Title VII claim);
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II. THE AIR LINE PILOTS Ass 'N, INTERNATIONAL DECISION29
Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International is the only reported case to consider
the question of whether a union-negotiated waiver of a judicial forum for
statutory claims is a mandatory subject of bargaining.30 In that case, the
employer required trainee pilots, who were not represented by the union until
they completed their training, to agree to various conditions as a part of a
contract for employment, including a clause that expressly required
arbitration of statutory claims.3 1 Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA") filed
suit, alleging that the airline violated the Railway Labor Act by unilaterally
imposing on the pilots individual contracts concerning mandatory subjects of
bargaining without first negotiating with the union. 32 The employer,
disclaiming any intent to apply the individual agreements to contractual
claims, contended that it had the right to insist on arbitration of statutory
claims as a condition of employment. 33
The District Court agreed with ALPA that the arbitration clause was a
mandatory subject of bargaining and enjoined the employer from applying it
to any employee represented by the union.34 The court, which issued its
decision prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wright, concluded that the
union did not have the authority to waive the individual's right to a judicial
forum for statutory claims. However, the court disagreed with the employer's
argument that lack of union authority to agree to a waiver necessarily
determined that no bargaining with the union was required. The court agreed
with ALPA that the arbitration agreement was a working condition and
therefore the employer was required to obtain union consent before executing
an individual contract with any union-represented employee. Since the
arbitration provision imposed by the employer governed the rules or

Varner v. Nat'] Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir 1993).
29 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'] v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 480.
32 There has been relatively little litigation over the scope of bargaining under the
Railway Labor Act. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT 205 {Douglas L. Leslie, ed. 1995).
Although some courts have applied the National Labor Relations Act {NLRA) concepts
of mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act, there
has been little judicial development applying the concepts to specific subjects. Id. at 206.
33 Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, Int'/, 199 F.3d at 481.
34 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'] v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Civ. Action No. 97-1917,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22739, at *29 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1998).
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conditions of employment, like the arbitration provision in the collective
bargaining agreement, it was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
District Court.3 5 After extensively analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions
relating to arbitration of statutory claims, including Wright, the court agreed
with the circuits that have concluded that the union cannot waive the
employee's right to a judicial forum for statutory claims. The court stated the
following:
Absent congressional intent to the contrary, a union may not use the
employees' individual statutory right to a judicial forum as a bargaining
chip to be exchanged for some benefit to the group; the statutory right "can
form no part of the collective bargaining process." Applying this rule to the
facts of the present case, ALPA cotild not lawfully agree to the Arbitration
Clause because it would effect a waiver of the employees' right to a judicial
forum for the vindication of their statutory claims of discrimination in
employment.36

Rejecting ALPA's argument that the arbitration of employment claims
was a mandatory bargaining subject even if the union could not waive the
employees' right to a judicial forum, the court stated that no subject could be
mandatory if either party did not have the authority to offer and agree to it.
Furthermore, the court held that the union could not bargain for the
procedures to be used in the arbitration as only the individual could
determine those procedures.
Since the arbitration clause was not a mandatory subject, the employer
could lawfully propose it to the individual employees directly, and impose it
upon them, without violating the statute.37 According to the court, the
arbitration clause was consistent with the collective bargaining agreement,
35 Air Line J?ilots Ass'n, Int'/, 199 F.3d at 487.
36 Id. at 484-85 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974)).
37 Imposition of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims might be challenged on
other grounds. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999);
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
employees cannot be required as a condition of employment to arbitrate Title VII claims);
Cole v. Burns Int'] Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that claimants who do not
''lmowingly'' agree cannot be required to submit Title VII claims to arbitration); EEOC v.
River Oaks Imaging, No. CN.A.H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1995)
(enjoining application of compulsory arbitration policy at EEOC request when policy was
implemented after two employees had filed EEOC charges and employees were fired for
refusing to sign the policy without consulting attorneys); EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration
ofEmployment Discrimination Disputes as A Condition ofEmployment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 405:7511 (July 7, 1997) (setting forth EEOC opposition to mandatory arbitration).
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and the employer was not attempting to affect the agreement or to avoid
dealing with the union. Thus far, the Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International
court is the only court to deal with the issue. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) has not yet considered the question.
As Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International illustrates, regardless of whether
the employer seeks to confine statutory claims to the arbitral forum through
collective bargaining or through individual agreements to arbitrate, in the
unionized workplace, the determination of whether waiver of the right to a
judicial forum for statutory claims is a mandatory subject of bargaining is
crucial. If a subject is mandatory, the employer can insist to the point of
impasse on its inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement.3 8 Accordingly,
a union whose members are not prepared to take economic action to preserve
their right to litigate statutory discrimination claims might be forced to
include a waiver in the agreement in order to obtain a collective bargaining
agreement. If the subject is permissive rather than mandatory, the employer
can seek such a clause in negotiations but cannot insist that it be a part of any
agreement.39 Thus a conclusion that the subject is permissive would enable a
union to resist its inclusion in the agreement without taking economic action
or trading other benefits to retain the right to litigate. There is another equally
important consequence of the categorization, however, which is illustrated by
the Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International case. If the subject is not mandatory,
the employer may be free to negotiate individually with the employees for
such a waiver so long as the individual negotiations do not interfere with or
waive any collectively bargained rights or the employees' section 7 rights to
organize and bargain collectively.40 A further limitation is that the individual
negotiations cannot be used to undermine the union. 41

III. BARGAINING UNDER THE NLRA
The Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, International decision provides one court's
view of the issue in the context of the Railway Labor Act. The court based its
decision on its conclusion that the union has no authority to waive the
employees' right to a judicial forum. Were the issue to come before the
NLRB, however, that determination, at least insofar as it arises from
interpretation of the statutory discrimination laws, would not be within the

38 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
39 Id. at 349.
4o See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39
(1944).
41 See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944).
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jurisdiction of the NLRB.42 At present, with the issue of the legality of such
waivers unresolved by the Supreme Court, and With asplit in the circuits, the
Board would have to decide the questiori of the stafus of tlie bargaining
subject without definitive guidance ori the legality of waivers.43

A. Mandatory Bargaining Subjects Under the NLRA
Jn determining how the NLRB might approach the issue,44 analysis
begins with a review of the statute and the Supreme Court cases regarding
what constitutes a mandatory subject.45 The statutory description of
bargaining subjects is quite general. Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)46 make it an
unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively if the union is the
representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a).47
Section 9(a) specifies that representatives chosen by the majority of the
employees are exclusive repres~ntatives- for -the purposes of bargaining
collectively with respect to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ...." 48 Section 8(d) defines collective
bargaining as the obligation to "confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment .. : . ;•49 Arbitration of
42 However, the Board might decide that such a waiver is impermissible under the
NLRA. See infra notes 143-57, 198.
43 See United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(finding no violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994),
where the employer insisted to impasse on inclusion of a proposal to waive the union's
right to remove from state court to federal court a~ action to enjoin a strike pending
arbitration, noting that in good faith the company might have believed its proposal to be
legally enforceable).
44 While the analysis herein is focused on the NLRA, much of it would apply
equally under the Railway Labor Act.
45 Beginning with Justice Harlan's dissent in NLRB v. Wooster Division of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S: 342 (1958), there has been' widespread criti~ism of the
classification of subjects as mandatory or permissive. Id. at 351. As Justice Harlan and
others have argued, limiting insistence to mandatory subjects resJ;ricts the flexibility of
the parties and may prevent the evolution of coliective bargaining as the workplace
develops and changes. For further discussion of this issue, see Archibald Cox & John T.
Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63
HARV. L. REV. 389, 391-401(1950) (suggesting even before Borg-Warner that the
NLRA was not intended to give the Board the authority to determine the scope of
collective bargaining); Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective
Labor Law, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 791, 806-09 (1998). !
46 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1994).
47 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
48/d.
49 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1994).
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statutory discrimination claims must fit within the definition of "terms and
conditions of employment" to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In addressing the scope of mandatory bargaining in NLRB v. Wooster
Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,so the Supreme Court considered whether
bargaining was required over a ballot clause which bound the union to
submit the employer's final offer to the employees before any strike. The
Court found that the clause related to the relationship of the union and the
employees, not of the employer and the employees, and therefore it was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Moreover, it weakened the independence of
the union and enabled the employer to deal directly with the employees
rather than the union.
In 1971, the Court rejected the Board's determination that retiree health
insurance benefits were a mandatory· subject of bargaining.SI With little
deference to the Board, the Court held that retirees were not members of the
active workforce and not encompassed within the statutory definition of
employee. The Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Borg-Warner that
bargaining is required only over subjects that "settle an aspect of the
relationship between the employer and employees."52
In Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,53 the Court returned to its deferential
posture vis-a-vis the Board's decisions regarding bargaining subjects, stating
"if [the Bo~d's] construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should
not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the
statute."54 Without positing a specific test for determining whether a subject
is mandatory, the Court affirmed the Board's decision, noting that the
availability and the price of food in the workplace were "plainly germane to
the 'working environment. "'55 The Court also relied on the industrial practice
of bargaining about the subject, finding the practice relevant but not
dispositive. In addition, the Court noted that prior decisions by the Board and
Courts of Appeal had found other aspects of food service to be negotiable.

so NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
5! Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404

U.S. 157, 166 (1971).
52 Id. at 178. In supporting this holding, the Court noted the potential for internal
conflicts that would arise if retirees were considered a part of the bargaining unit, and
articulated a fear that the union might favor active employees over retirees. Id. at 173.
The Court held, relying on prior decisions, that bargaining over ''third party concem[s]"
may be mandatory, but only if it "vitally affects" the terms and conditions of employment
of the bargaining unit employees. Id. at 179. Retiree health insurance benefits did not. Id.
53 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441U.S.488 (1979).
54 Id. at 497.
55 Id. at 498 (citation omitted).
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Food prices are not trivial, nor would bargaining be unduly disruptive. 56
Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the value of bargaining, citing Professor Cox's
seminal article on the duty to bargain in good faith. 57
Applying these decisions to the subject at issue here, an agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims of employees, is the beginning point of the analysis.
Arbitration of statutory claims involves the relationship of the employer and
the employees, at least insofar as the statutory claim relates to the employeremployee relationship. Discrimination cases, which have generated most of
the litigation challenging arbitration agreements, clearly relate to the
employer-employee relationship. Nondiscrimination clauses are mandatory
subjects of bargaining, and employee efforts to eliminate discrimination in
the workplace have long been considered protected concerted activity.SS
Other statutory issues such as minimum wage and overtime pay claims under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193859 and claims for leave under the Family
Medical Leave Act60 similarly relate to the relationship between the
56 The Court also noted that food prices did not affect the entrepreneurial interest of
the employer. Id. Further, the Court reaffirmed that the ''vitally affects" test of Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers applies only where the matter at issue does not involve the
relationship of the employer and its employees. Id. at 501.
57 "Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly fixed position
either because new facts are brought to light or because the strengths and wealmesses of
the several arguments become apparent. Sometimes the ·parties hit upon some novel
compromise of an issue which has been thrashed over and over. Much is gained even by
giving each side a better picture of the strength of the other's convictions. The cost is so
slight that the potential gains easily justify legal compulsion to engage in the discussion."
Id. at 502, citing Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1401, 1412 (1958).
SS Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Gatliff
Coal Co. v. NLRB, 953 F.2d 247, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming Board decision that two
employees were unlawfully terminated for the.ir concerted protest against gender-related
harassment); United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (stating that workers have a right to engage in concerted activity to obtain ''racially
integrated working conditions"); Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 819, 822
{1994) (finding employees, who after consultation with one another separately
approached employer about racially discriminatory wages and then went together to file
separate charges with state anti-discrimination agency, were engaged in protected
concerted activity); Vought Corp.-MLRS Sys. Div., 273 N.L.R.B. 1290, 1299 {1984)
(finding employee's discussion of rumor that white employee would be promoted over
black employee was protected concerted activity); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148
N.L.R.B. 1402, 1405 (1964) (holding that concerted activity of employees to protest
racially discriminatory hiring practices was protected by§ 8(a)(l)), enforced in relevant
part, 349 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1965).
59 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994 & Supp. 2000)
60 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-19, 2631-36, 2651-54 {1994 & Supp. 2000); 5 U.S.C.
§§ 6381-87 (1994 & Supp. 2000)
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employer and employees.61 The industrial practice regarding bargaining over
arbitration of statutory claims is, at best, unclear. While a few courts have
found language in collective bargaining agreements sufficient to require
arbitration of statutory claims, most courts have found either that the
language does not require arbitration or that the union cannot bind the
employee to arbitrate such claims. 62 Given this disagreement, it would be
difficult to reach any conclusion about the practice of bargaining over such
issues.
Looking to related issues is somewhat more helpful. The two ways in
which the courts have found that a union can agree to arbitrate statutory
claims to the exclusion of litigation are by incorporation of statutory claims
in the arbitration clause of the agreement, or by incorporation of the statutory
provisions as a part of the agreement. The Board has long held that
bargaining over arbitration provisions is required.63 Indeed, arbitration is a
central feature of national labor policy.64 The Board has construed the statute
to require bargaining over the structure of the arbitration process, including
the subjects to be arbitrated or excluded from arbitration,65 the method of

6I Arbitration of statutory claims does not implicate any entrepreneurial interest of
the employer. First Nat'I Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 666-67 (1981)
(''bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management
relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the
conduct of the business.").
62 Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone &
Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (I Ith Cir. 1997); Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv.
Corp., 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) (requiring arbitration of
statutory claim under collective bargaining agreement), rev'd, 525 U.S. 70 (1998)
(finding no clear and unequivocal waiver of right to litigate rather than arbitrate); Austin
v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (requiring
arbitration of statutory claim under collective bargaining agreement). As noted supra
notes 18-26 and accompanying text, few courts have found language sufficient to require
arbitration of statutory claims since Wright. Moreover, it is not clear, even when the
courts required arbitration, that the parties intended to negotiate language that required
arbitration of statutory claims and waived the employees' right to litigate.
63 Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Workers'
Int'I Union, 28 F.3d 347, 360 (3d Cir. 1994); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133
F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir.
1941).
64 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
6 5 Mayes Bros., 145 N.L.R.B. 181, 187 (1963) (finding employer did not violate the
NLRA by insisting that discipline and discharge be excluded from arbitration).
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selecting the arbitrator,66 methods of enforcement of the arbitration award, 67
and the utilization of a transcript of arbitration proceeqipgs.68 Virtually all
collective bargaining· agreements contain arbitration provisions.69
Historically, however, the arbitration provisions at issue involved arbitration
of contractual rather than statutory disputes. Similarly, the ·Board has long
held that nondiscrimination provisions are mandatory subjects of
bargaining,70 and nondiscrimination provisions are commonly included in
collective bargaining agreements.71
Arbitration of statutory claims deals directly with the scope of the
arbitration clause. Prior Board decisions would suggest that bargaining over
the subjects to be arbitrated is required. Similarly, bargaining over the scope
of the cont:J;actual prohibition on discrimination seems encompassed by prior
66 Indep. Stave Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 219, 228 (1980) (finding employer violated Act
by refusing to comply with the arbitrator selection clause in the agreement, thereby
violating the duty to bargain).
67 Star Expansion Indus. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 563, 583 (1967) (finding provision
that allowed arbitrator to enjoin temporarily a strike or lockout violative of the no
strike/no lockout clause after ex parte hearing, permitting enforcement of award in state
court, and waiving right to remove enforcement action to federal court to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining), review denied sub no~. United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d
150 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
68 Communications Workers of Am., 280 N.L.R.B. 78, 80-81 (1986) (finding union
violated the Act by unilaterally refusing to agree to preparation, use, and cost-sharing of
transcripts of arbitration hearings in act:ordance with past practice).
69 COOPER, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that 99% of collective bargaining agreements
provide for arbitration of some types of grievances (citing BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION
CONTRACTS 37 {14th ed. 1995))).
70 Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 273 (1973), ajf'd sub nom. United
Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Farmers' Coop.
Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290, 295 {1968) (finding employer violated section 8(a)(5) by
failing to bargain meaningfully over elimination of discrimination in the plant), ajf'd sub
nom. United Packinghouse Workers Int'} Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Because virtually all of the cases involving arbitration oflegal claims in the
collective bargaining context have involved discrimination cases, the focus here is on
statutory discrimination claims. The analysis is not limited to such claims, however, as
employers could seek agreements to arbitrate claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
e.g., Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995), the Family Medical Leave Act, other
federal or state statutes or even common law claims such as tortious discharge in
violation of public policy. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988) (finding that§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1994), does not preempt state claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy).
71 N. PETER. LAREAU, DRAFTING THE UNION CONTRACT: A HANDBOOK FOR THE
MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATOR, § SA-10 (1998) ("It has ·been estimated that 94% of all
·
collective bargaining agreements contain a non~discnmination clause.").
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board decisions that require bargaining over nondiscrimination clauses. This
simple and straightforward analysis ignores the effect of the provisions at
issue, however, which is to waive the employee's right to litigate statutory
discrimination claims.

B. Waiver as a Non-mandatory Bargaining Subject
The Board has issued several decisions dealing with classification of
waivers of various rights as bargaining subjects. In Kolman/Athey Division of
Athey Products Corp.,12 the Board majority affirmed the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge that the employer violated section 8(a)(5) of the
Act by insisting to impasse on a contractual provision that waived the
employee's right to pursue a contractual grievance if the employee filed
charges with any state or federal agency.73 While the majority expressly
stated no rationale, it disclaimed reliance on Gardner-Denver14 and found it
unnecessary to decide whether the proposal was permissive or illegal.75
Member Stephens' concurrence contained a more extensive rationale.76 He
relied on cases which held that contract proposals relating to the grievance
and arbitration procedure were not mandatory subjects of bargaining if they
would have an adverse effect on the collective bargaining process.77 Member
Stephens then reasoned that the proposal which required election of remedies
would have a "severe adverse impact on the Union's ability to engage in
grievance discussions" and therefore was permissive.78 Since employees
could preempt the union's processing of a grievance by filing a charge with
the NLRB or any other government agency, the union's ability to represent
the employees was severely compromised.

72 Kolman/Athey Div. of Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92 (1991).
73 Id. at 92.
74 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974), the Supreme Court

held that an employee's claim that his discharge violated Title VII could proceed in court
despite a prior arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement which upheld his
termination. In Wright, the Court suggested some tension between Gardner-Denver,
which stated that an employee's Title VII rights could not be waived prospectively, and
Gilmer, which upheld a prospective waiver of a judicial forum for an ADEA claim, but
found it unnecessary to decide whether a union's prospective waiver was valid. Wright v.
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 76-77 (1998).
75 Kolman/Athey, 303 N.L.R.B. at 92 n.2.
76 Id. at 92-93.
77 Id. at 93 (citing Communications Workers of Am., 280 N.L.R.B. 78 (1986), and
cases cited therein).
78 Id.
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While the limited explanation by-the majority provides little gtiidance,
the more extensive rationale of Member Stephens focusing on the impact of
the proposal on the collective bargaining process has relevance to waivers of
the right to litigate statutory clairns.79 The Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ)
analysis is also helpful. The ALJ concluded that insistence on the waiver of
the right to litigate in multiple fora was unlawful, distinguishing such
waivers from waivers of statutory collective rights such as the right to strike
or the right to bargain during the. term of the collective bargaining
agreement.SO The authority, cited by the ALJ primarily includes cases where
the Board found unlawful insistence to impasse on a waiver of employee
and/or union rights to file unfair labor practice charges or grievances under
the collective bargaining agreement.81 In discussing the issue, however, the
ALJ noted that a union attempt to enforce an arbitration award prohibiting
gender, race, or national origin discrimination could be nullified by an
employee statutory charge of discrimination filed with an agency. 82 He went
on to cite Gardner-Denver and to note that the required election ofremedies
would prevent employees from using different "forums providing different
remedies in the interests of differing public and private policies and goals for
the sole reason similar facts give rise to their invocation."83 The statutory
waiver contemplated herein differs from the election of remedies provision
discussed by the ALJ in Kolman/Athey only in that it makes the election for
the employee, rather than making it dependent on the employee's decision to
file a charge.84 The ALJ's reliance on Gardner-Denver, however, casts some
doubt ~n the survival of the analysis if Gardner-Denver no longer governs. 85
79 See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.

80 Kolman/Athey, 303 N.L.R.B. at 96.
81 Id.
82Id.
83 Id.
84 It might also be argued that the waiver of a judicial forum does not preclude the
employee from filing an EEOC charge, but only from initiating a lawsuit. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d
805 (4th Cir. 1999) (permitting EEOC to proceed with lawsuit despite arbitration
agreement because EEOC is vindicating the public interest in eradicating discrimination,
but precluding EEOC from seeking relief for individual in the lawsuit). Given the smaII
percentage of cases litigated by the EEOC, however, and the judicial decisions precluding
individual relief in EEOC cases where the employee agreed to arbitration, this distinction
makes little difference:
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In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,86 the Board directly addressed the issue of
whether a waiver of the employee's right to seek redress from the Board for
discipline related to violation of a no strike clause was a mandatory subject
of bargaining. 87 The Board found insistence to impasse on such a waiver to
be contrary to the policy of the statute and unrelated to terms and conditions
of employment.88 Accordingly, without finding whether the waiver was a
permissive or illegal subject, the Board concluded that bargaining was not
mandatory.89 In so holding, the Board cited the importance of unimpeded
access to the agency, relying on both Supreme Court and NLRB cases that
find union constitutional provisions that limit Board access unlawfuJ.90 With
less analysis, the Board found that, unlike a no-strike clause, the waiver did
not regulate relations between the employer and employees or settle a term or
condition of employment.91
Fiscal Year (FY)
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

No. of Charees

No. of Lawsuits

87,529
77,990
80,680
79,591
77,444

373
193
338
405
465

THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, CHARGE STATISTICS FY
1992 THROUGH FY 2000, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last
modified Jan. 18, 2001).
·
8S While Gardner-Denver is still good law, the Court in Wright suggested that some
tension exists between Gardner-Denver and the later Gilmer decision. Wright v.
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 76-77 (1998). Were the Court to decide
that a union-negotiated waiver of the right to litigate statutory claims was enforceable,
Gardner-Denver would likely be overruled or at least limited. See Wright, 525 U.S. at 80
(suggesting that Gardner-Denver contains a "seemingly absolute prohibition of union
waiver of employees' federal forum rights.").
86 Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 69 (1988), enforced in relevant part, 906
F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
87 Id. at 72.
88 Id. at 71.
89 Id. at 72.
90 Id. at 71-72 (citing NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of
Am., Local 22, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968); Int'! Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 138,
148 N.L.R.B. 679, 684 (1964) (finding union violated the NLRA by fining union member
for filing NLRB charges without first exhausting internal remedies); Int'! Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 277 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1072 (1985) (finding
union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) by disciplining union official who filed NLRB charges,
even where union was pursuing legitimate union interests, because discipline interfered
with access to the Board).
9l Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. at 72; see also Bryant & Stratton Bus.
Inst., 327 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1999) (holding that demand that union waive its right to file

528

· . IS BAJlGAINING WITH THE UNION REQUIRED

Perhaps closer in fact to_ the waiyer of judicial forum a.t issue here is
Borden, Inc. 92 In Borden, the ei:µployer, negotiating over the effects of a
plant closing, insisted 'that employee.s, who elected severan:ce pay, sign a
general release of ."Claim8 for wages, employment, reemployment,
reinstatement, and 'any and all causes of action whatsoever' whjch an
employee might have against Respondent as result of his employment."93
The union indicated a willingness to agr~e to a release limited to contractual
rights and rights relating· to termination of employment, but expressed
particular concern over reieasmg rights to file health and safety claims
relating to exposure to a carcinogenic substance used in the workplace.94 The
Board adopted the ALJ's finding that a general release is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The ALJ dete.rntlned that.the classification of a waiver
of a future legal right was dependent on the nature of the right extinguished
by the waiver. He concluded that a general release of all future claims arising
out of previous employment "is too attenuated· from the actual terms and
conditions of that employment to be a mandatory subject ofbargairiing."95
The Board has also held that the issue of whether tQ maintain a lawsuit or
unfair labor practice charge, or to settle. such a charge, is not a mandatory
subject ofbargaining.96 Accordingly, insistence on an agreement not to file,
or to settle, violates the duty to bargain in good faith.97

a

unfair labor practice charges as a condition of granting a wage increase was a nonmandatory subject of bargaining).
92 Borden, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 396 (1986).
93 Id. at 398.
94Id.
95 Id. at 399 n.5.
96 See, e.g., Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst., 327 N.L.R.B. at 1135; Laredo Packing Co.,
254 N.L.R.B. 1 (1981) (finding settlement of dispute over back pay liability and
withdrawal of breach of contract lawsuit and unfair labor practice charges to be nonmandatory subjects of bargaining); Peerless Food Products, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 530, 534
(1977) (finding unlawful an employer's conditionjng of agreement upon withdrawal of
lawsuit that sought contributions to pension trust)~ Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533
F.2d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that conditioning bargaining on withdrawal of
unfair labor practice charge violates section 8(a)(5)); NLRB v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 447 F.2d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that UI)ion insistence that
contractors' association drop litigation over trust fund management as a condition of
bargaining violated section 8(b)(3) as subject non-mandatory).
97 See supra note 96.
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C. Application of the Law to Forum Waivers
The analysis in Borden98 and the other cases holding that settlement or
maintenance of lawsuits or unfair labor practice charges is a non-mandatory
subject supports an argument that waiver of a judicial forum is also a nonmandatory subject. Like the general release that incorporates waivers of
health and safety claims, it may be too attenuated from terms and conditions
of employment to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining. Yet it relates
to nondiscrimination obligations and the forum in which they will be
litigated, subjects that seem intimately related to terms and conditions of
employment. Only if statutory rights are viewed as distinct from terms and
conditions of employment does the rationale make sense. Borden does
suggest that the nature of the right extinguished by the waiver determines
whether the subject is mandatory. Waivers of the right to strike and the right
to bargain have been held to be mandatory subjects.99 Waivers of the right to
file or maintain unfair labor practice charges or lawsuits are not. Although
the cases cited above involve unfair labor practice charges or lawsuits
directly related to the collective bargaining agreement or protected union
activity, such as breach of contract claims or suits relating to employee
benefit trust funds, the rationale may be even stronger for lawsuits involving
individual employee rights.too
While the rationale for finding settlement or withdrawal of lawsuits or
charges to be non-mandatory subjects is not clearly articulated in many
cases, the argument of an attenuated relationship to terms and conditions of
employment is not particularly persuasive. The lawsuits and unfair labor
practice charges at issue in many of the Board's cases related directly to
terms and conditions of employment, although not perhaps to negotiation of
those terms. Better rationales for finding waivers and settlements to be nonmandatory are the need to preserve access to the Board and the courts, and
the reluctance to allow employers or unions to condition access to statutory
rights, such as the right to bargain, on waiver of other rights, such as the right
to litigate under statutes designed to protect the public interest. For the same
98 Borden, 279 N.L.R.B. at 396.

99 NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952) (finding no per se
violation where the employer bargained for a management functions clause that gave
unilateral control to the employer over matters such as promotion and discipline); In re
Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1350 (1948) (finding no bad faith bargaining where
parties reached impasse on no strike clause). It has been argued, however, that
interpreting the Act to permit such waivers weakens the statutory protection for workers.
See generally Peter Phillips, The Contractual Waiver of Individual Rights Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 793 (1986).
100 See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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reason that unions cannot penalize members for exercising their right to file
charges with the NLRB, employers should not be permitted to condition
collective bargaining on the union's agreemen~ to waive employees' rights to
file lawsuits to vindicate their statutory rights. If a union or an employer
cannot be forced to settle, drop, or prospectively waive litigation over a
benefits trust or breach of a collective bargaining agreem~nt in order to
obtain a collective bargaining agreement (and thereby labor peace), then that
same entity cannot be forced to sacrifice employee rights, particularly where
such rights are infused with the public interest. Since there may be a greater
willingness to sacrifice rights that do not belong to the union in the first
place, the Board should be more vigilant tp insure that the waiver is not used
·
as a club in collective bargaining.
If the Board were to find that waivers of individual employee rights were
mandatory subjects of bargaining, the employer cquld condition bargaining
over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment on employee
waivers of their right to enforce various employee protective ·statutes. IOI An
IOI This assumes, of course, that such ~aivers are p~ssible under the statute or
common law giving rise to the right. Forcing an employee to sacrifice the right to litigate
in order to obtain a collective bargaining agreement is analogous to forcing an employee
to give up a statutory right to retain employment. Courts in many states have found it
violative of public policy to terminate employees for asserting statutory rights, even
where the statutes have no retaliation protection. E.g., Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 665
A.2d 833, 834-35 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding wrongful discharge where employee was
terminated for seeking unemployment benefits because public policy clearly provi~ed for
such benefits); Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 776 P. 2d 752, 754 (Wyo.
1989) (finding employees could bring retaliatory discharge action when terminated for
filing workers' compensation claims); Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645,
652 (Kan. 1988) (extending to employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement
the right to bring retaliatory discharge action based on filing for workers' compensation
benefits, based on public policy in the Workers' Compensation Act); Harless v. First
Nat'I Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978) (finding employee could file
claim for wrongful discharge based on retaliation for attempting to force employer to
comply with state and federal statutes protecting credit consumers). The rationale for
these cases is that if the employee has a statutory right, termination of the employee for
asserting that right is against public policy. The Supreme Court's decision in Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994), further supports the conclusion that the waiver is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court there found state law preempted when it
penalized employees who exercised their statutory right to bargaining collectively by
exempting them from the state law. Id. at 135. The Court stated: "A state rule predicating
benefits on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law poses special dangers
of interference with congressional purpose." Id. at 116. So too does an employer
requirement that the exercise of collective bargaining rights be conditioned on waiver of
judicial litigation of other statutory claims. See also Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm., 389
U.S. 235, 239 (1967) (preempting Florida law disqualifying employee from receiving
unemployment compensation benefits because she filed unfair labor practice charge,
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employer could obtain a waiver of employee rights to file workers'
compensation claims, enforce health and safety statutes, enforce pension
rights under ERISA, litigate claims of retaliatory discharge for reporting
statutory violations, 102 and so on. If unions resisted employer attempts to
obtain waivers, it would frustrate the primary goal of the statuteencouraging collective bargaining to promote labor peace. While courts and
other enforcement agencies might find such waivers ineffective under the
statute being enforced, the chilling effect of the waiver might preclude many
claims from ever reaching the enforcement agency. Moreover, the lack of
certainty about the validity of the waiver would lead to union resistance and
thereby interfere with the goal of peaceful settlement of labor disputes.
The Board has a long history of regulation designed to preserve the
process of collective bargaining because of its centrality to the statutory
purpose. Thus, although the Board is generally precluded from regulating
economic weapons in order to balance bargaining power because it intrudes
on the bargaining process, 103 the Board may do so where the conduct
frustrates or substantially interferes with the bargaining process.104 Recently,
the Board crafted an exception to the policy that unilateral implementation of
contract proposals is permissible once the parties have bargained to
impasse. 105 The Board's rationale, approved by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, was that the merit pay proposal at issue
would adversely impact the collective bargaining process.106 Because the
proposal gave the employer standardless discretion, it would detrimentally
affect future negotiations by ensuring that the union could not bargain
analogizing state action to coercive employer actions which frustrate Congressional
purpose ofleaving employees free to file charges).
102 While in many cases prospective waivers of the right to file claims implicate the
public interest, wrongful discharge claims in which the employee is terminated for
reporting unlawful or dangerous employer conduct pose particular risk, for employees
will be dissuaded from reporting conduct that may harm the public, and individuals other
than employees may be unaware of such conduct. E.g., Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960
P.2d 1046, 1056 (Cal. 1998) (citing public policy favoring air line safety in upholding
reversal of summary judgment in favor of employer that terminated employee for
objecting to shipping of defective parts to airline manufacturers); Norris v. Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc., 74 Haw. 235, 842 P.2d 634, 644--45 (Haw. 1992) (upholding employee's
wrongful discharge claim where he was fired for reporting discrepancies in airline's
maintenance records).
103 NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'! Union, 361 U.S. 477, 496 (1960).
104 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962); Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Service v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 419 (1982).
105 See McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1996), enforced, 131 F.2d
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
106 Id. at 1388.
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-lmowledgeably over wages, an issue central to the collective bargaining
process.107 Similarly here, the conclusion that the waiver is a mandatory
subject of bargaining would detrimentally affect the process of collective
bargaining by making it dependent upon an agreement to waive the statutory
rights of individual employees. Bargaining rights could be held hostage to
obtain agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, entangling the statutorilymandated bargaining process with employer efforts to minimize litigation
costs and perhaps with enforcement efforts relating to other employment
statutes.108 ,
Moreover, as noted by Member Stephens, those contract proposals
relating to the grievance and arbitration procedure that would adversely
impact the collective bargaining process are not mandatory.109 Forcing all
statutory claims into the arbitration process may adversely affect the union's
ability to process and handle grievances due to the increased volume of
cases. In addition for reasons set forth more fully below, mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims will impact arbitration of contractual claims
due to the frequent overlap of the claims.110 Thus, for this reason also, the
waiver should be a non-mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Supreme ~ourt has evinced a concern with allowing a union to
waive employee rights where the union's interests may conflict with that of
the employees. In NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 11 1 the Supreme Court noted that
the ability of the union to waive employee rights such as the right to strike,
was premised on fair representation by the unioJ?. and on the employee's right
to choose his or her bargaining representative freely.112 In Magnavox, the
Supreme Court held that the union could not lawfully waive the right to
distribute literature on company premises because of the interference with
employee rights, which might conflict with the union's self interest in
preventing employees supportive of oth~r unions from distributing
literature. 11 3 Even where no conflict is apparent, the Board should not find
the subject mandatory because the union may be less vigilant about
107 Id. at 1390-91.
108 For a discussion of the way in which employers might utilize arbitration
agreements to contract out of their statutory nondiscrimination obligations, see Malin,
supra note 2, at 601-22.
109 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 186-215 and accompanying text.
111 NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
112 Id. at 324.
113 Id. For discussion of possible conflictS between union and employee interests,
see Hodges, supra note 3, at 143-45; Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination Labor
and Employment Arbitration and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual
Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORYL. J. 135, 201 (2000).
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protecting the employee right, and quick to waive such a right to obtain
benefits for the members of the bargaining unit.114 Union resistance may be
particularly difficult where there is strong employee pressure to obtain an
agreement with immediate benefits, such as wage increases and pension and
insurance benefits. While the waiver may adversely affect bargaining unit
members eventually, the employees are not likely to value highly the right to
litigate at the time of negotiations.115 Thus, the importance of finding such a
waiver non-mandatory rivals that of a settlement of unfair labor practice
charges or a lawsuit filed by the union, a subject in which the union may see
a much more direct interest.
It might be argued that the waiver at issue here is a mandatory subject of
bargaining because the only waiver is of the forum, rather than the claim.
The claim can still be litigated, albeit in the arbitral rather than the judicial
forum. The Board in Kolman/Athey, however, found the waiver of the forum
only to be non-mandatory. 11 6 A further difficulty with this argument is that,
while assuming arguendo that individual arbitration is a mere substitution of
a different forum, arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is
not. 117 Under a collective bargaining agreement, the union, not the employee,
controls the decision about whether to arbitrate and how to arbitrate,
including who serves as arbitrator, what arguments to make, and who
represents the union in the arbitration.118 Indeed the agreement to waive a
judicial forum may result in an employee's discrimination claim receiving no
hearing at all, despite the desires of the employee.119 In fact then, the waiver
is more substantive than a mere forum waiver. Even assuming the union can
lawfully waive the right, the employer should not be able to force such a
waiver by conditioning collective bargaining on it.
In the latter sense, the waiver is analogous to settlement as a bargaining
subject. The union (or the employer) can lawfully drop or settle an unfair
labor practice or lawsuit, and indeed our legal system encourages settlement.
114 For reasons set forth in my earlier work, unions should be reluctant to agree to

such a waiver. See Hodges, supra note 3, at 157-59. Nevertheless, employees may be
unwilling to strike over the issue because of the lack of immediate relevance as
contrasted with wages, thereby pressuring the union to agree to a waiver. Id. at 162.
115 Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake ofGilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 29 (1996).
116 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
117 For a thorough discussion of the reasons, see Hodges, supra note 3, at 154-55.
l l8 See id. at 145-50.
119 E.g., Moore v. Duke Power Co., 971 F. Supp. 978, 983 (W.D.N.C. 1997)
(finding litigation of the employee's disability discrimination claim precluded by an
arbitration agreement even though union in arbitration never raised the issue of disability
discrimination).
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Nevertheless, collective bargaining cannot be conditioned on settlement or
withdrawal of a charge or lawsuit. Ito Nor should it be conditioned on
agreement to waive the employees' statutory right to a judicial forum.
An additional argument that a wai.ver of the right to a judicial forum is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining posits that agreement to such a waiver
would violate the union's duty of fair representation. In Southwestern
Pipe, 121 the Board held th~t it was unlawful for an employer to insist that an
agreement include a nondiscrimination.clause that would require the union to
breach its duty of fair representation.1 22 The Board adopted the Trial
Examiner's decision, which found that the provision insisted upon by the
employer would prevent the union from grieving on behalf of an AfricanAmerican employee who received a lower rate of pay for doing the same
work as a white employee despite eq~l seniority, skill, and productivity. The
Trial Examiner concluded that agreement to such a provision would breach
the union's duty of fair representation and subject it to liability under Title
VII. Although the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement, the basis for the denial
was not the principle upon which the Board relied, but rather the conclusion
that the language proffered by the employer should not be interpreted to
preclude the union from challenging employer discrimination.123 Following
Southwestern Pipe, it might be argued that insistence by the employer on a
waiver violates section 8(a)(5) by requiring the union to agree to breach its
duty of fair representation.
That argument, however, presupposes that agreement to a waiver
breaches the duty of fair representation. If the Supreme Court ultimately
concludes that such a waiver is impermissible, then it seems clear that
insistence on a union waiver would be a non-mandatory subject, based on
this rationale among others. However, if such a waiver is permissible under
discrimination law, as the Fourth Circuit has currently held, then it is difficult
to conclude that the mere agreement to a waiver would violate the duty of
fair representation. Were other circum8tances present, such as evidence that
the union's agreement was motivated by a desire to limit the rights of a

120 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
121 Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 364 (1969), enforcement denied in
relevant part, 44 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1971).
122 Id. at 376. As noted supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text, the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Magnavox, Co., 415 U.S. 322, 324 (1974), found that a permissible
waiver is premised on fair representation. Where the premise is missing, the waiver
should be impermissible.
123 The Board subsequently reaffirmed the principle in Graphic Arts Int 'l Union,
Local 280, 235 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1084 (1978).
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disfavored group, a breach of the duty would likely be found.124 But in such
a situation, the case facing the Board would be an allegation of a section
8(b)(l)(A) violation, not a complaint of employer insistence on a nonmandatory subject.125
One might also argue that a union breaches its duty of fair representation
by agreeing to limit judicial rights knowing that the union does not have the
resources to represent employees with statutory claims effectively in the
grievance procedure. Such an .action may not be discriminatory, absent
specific discriminatory intent, for it affects all employees in the bargaining
unit who have potential claims, but might be arbitrary or in bad faith.126
Again, however, the focus is on fair representation, not the status of the
l24 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (finding that the statutory duty of fair
representation that originated in a line of cases focusing on racial discrimination requires
that "the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated
unit includes a statutory obligation to serve interests of all members without hostility or
discrimination."); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 201 (1944) (holding that
where a statute provides for a representative to be chosen by a class of employees, that
representative is under a duty to represent all members of the class equally regardless of
race); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B.
312, 317 (1964) (finding violation of section 8(b)(l)(A) where union refused to process
grievances of African-American workers because of race and finding reliance on racially
discriminatory contract terms no defense); Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1367, 148
NLRB 897, 897-98 (1964) (finding "that (1) by maintaining and enforcing the 75-25
percent work distribution between Locals 1367 and 1368, respectively, based upon race
and union membership, in successive collective-bargaining agreements ... Respondents
have failed to comply with their· duty as exclusive bargaining representative to represent
all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and impartially, and thereby violated section
8(b)(l)(A) of the Act."); Indep. Metal Workers Union, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574
(1964) (finding that union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) by refusing to process grievance
based on the grievant's race and stating that although issue of validity of racially
discriminatory contract terms was not raised by the complaint, majority did not disagree
with the charging party that negotiation of such terms by union violates section
8(b)(l)(A)).
125 If evidence of the union's discriminatory motive were available, it might be used
to defeat an employer's motion for dismissal of a judicial claim on the basis of the
arbitration agreement. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)
(refusing to compel employee to arbitrate when agreement was so egregiously unfair as
to breach the company's duty to establish fair arbitration rules under the agreement);
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding arbitration agreement only
when certain requirements were met, and noting that an employee could not be compelled
to arbitrate a statutory claim under an agreement that was a condition of employment
when the employee was required to pay any of the costs of arbitration). A requirement
that the employee utilize an arbitration procedure with representation hostile to the
employee's interests would seem to be equally unfair.
l26 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (setting forth this
standard for duty of fair representation cases).
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bargaining subject. Taking the argument a step further, an employer that
insists on waiver of a judicial fonun for statutory claims· may violate section
8(a)(5) if it knows that the union cannot effectively handle the ·statutory
claims in the grievance procedure.1 27 Such ari argument makes the
classification of the bargaining subject t4m on,the employer's knowledge or
motivation. Setting aside the difficulties of proof, 128. the classification of
bargaining subjects has not traditionally. tµrned on motivation. Rather,
motivation has been an element of good faith bargaining. Thus, on~ could
argue that insistence on such an agreement does not .viola,te section 8(a)(5)
because it is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, but rather because the
employer is bargaining in bad faith by insisting on a proposal that is legal,
but predictably unacceptable since it · effectively eliminates employee
statutory rights and, therefore, causes the union to breach its duty of fair
representation.129 However, the Board is traditionally reluctant to find
surface bargaining based on the employer's position on one issue if the
employer appears to be bargaining in good faith on other subjc::cts.130 If it
appears, in a given case, that the employer
. . is using the waiver to frustrate
~

.

127 Cf. Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1977)
(holding employer may be joined in duty of fair representation claim if employer has
knowledge of union's breach).
128 The union might submit proof of the number of discrimination complaints and
the limits on its resources, but it is not clear whether that would be sufficient evidence or
whether employer knowledge of those facts and motivation could be established. In
addition, a union would likely be reluctant to argue ftirther its own ineffectiveness, even
if the benefits were greater than appears here.
129 See, e.g., Josten Concrete Prods. Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1032 (1989) (finding
"unpalatable" wage proposal and proposal for waiver of statutory rights designed to
frustrate bargaining); E. Tex. Steel Castings Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081-82 (1965)
(finding employer proposals on management rights and limited arbitration so predictably
unacceptable that requisite intent to reach agreement absent).
· 130 E.g., John S. Swift Co., 124 N.L:R.B. 394, 395 (1959), enforced in part and
denied in part, 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 19.60); The Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., -160
N.L.R.B. 334, 341 (1966). Moreover, effectively remedying such a violation is
notoriously difficult. See H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Andrew Strom,
Rethinking the NLRB's Approach to Union Recognition Agreements, 15 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB L. 50, 56 (1994) (relating H.K. Porter's limitations on bargaining remedies
to the lack of meaningful remedies for employer refusals to recognize and bargain with
unions selected by a majorify of their employees); The Supreme Court, 1969 TermNLRB Remedial Power to Impose Contract Tei-ms, 84 HARV.· L. REV. 202 (1970)
(discussing limits on the remedial powers of the Board); Note, NLRB Power to Award
Damages in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1688-93 (1971)
(distinguishing between remedies that award damages and the.i:emedial impo~ition of
contract terms).
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bargaining, the Board might find a violation without determining that the
waiver is not a mandatory subject ofbargaining.131
Although the above analysis concludes that the waiver is not a
mandatory bargaining subject, all other aspects of arbitration of statutory
claims come within the definition of mandatory bargaining subjects. Thus the
employer and union must bargain, upon request, about the scope of the
grievance and arbitration procedures and the process by which statutory
grievances are arbitrated, if they are included in any arbitration procedure. In
addition, the employer and union must bargain, upon request, about the
existence and scope of a nondiscrimination clause.
The practical result of this conclusion is that the employer and union may
bargain, and insist to the point of impasse, on all aspects of arbitration and
nondiscrimination clauses except for language that waives the employees'
right to litigate claims. Accordingly, neither can insist to the point of impasse
that the arbitration procedure expressly cover statutory claims or that any
nondiscrimination law be expressly incorporated into the agreement. 132 An
express waiver of the right to litigate such claims would be similarly off
limits.
A conclusion that waiver of the right to litigate statutory claims is not a
mandatory bargaining subject does not preclude the employer and the union
from agreeing to such a waiver, nor does it prohibit the union and employer
from soliciting employee waivers should they decide to provide for
arbitration of statutory claims.133 It merely prevents either party from
insisting to the point of impasse that such a provision be included in the
collective bargaining agreement. As many commentators have suggested,
arbitration may be an appropriate forum for litigation of some or all statutory
claims.134 The presence of the union may eliminate some of the identified
drawbacks of individual arbitration of statutory claims. 135 The experienced
131 H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370, 1372 (1965), enforced, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (finding employer's intransigent position on dues checkoff clause violated
duty to bargain in good faith because it was a "device to frustrate agreement.")
132 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
l33 Of course, the union could agree only if a union waiver was legally permissible.
Currently, such waivers are permissible in at least the Fourth Circuit.
13 4 See BALES, supra note 6, at 9-10; Turner, supra note 113, at 202; Lewis L.
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 29, 29-30, 63 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); Roberto L.
Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1066-70 {1996); R. Theodore Clark, Jr., A Management View of
Nonunion Employee Arbitration Procedures, in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 17677 (James L. Stem & Joyce M. Najita, eds. 1997).
135 See Hodges, supra note 3, at 168-69.
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union can assist employees with arbitration, provide information to
employees that will help prove the claim, and balance the power of the
employer as a repeat player in the arbitration process.136 However, it should
be the choice of the union and the employees it represents, rather than of the
employer alone, whether and how to incorporate statutory claims in the
collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration procedure. Furthermore,
unions, employees, and employers could agree to a voluntary procedure to
arbitrate statutory claims either before or after they arise, 137 utilizing either
the collectively bargained procedure or a separate arbitration procedure. To
the extent that there are benefits from arbitrating statutory claims, they will
be arbitrated voluntarily and a Board decision that prevents insistence on a
waiver will not preclude arbitration.

N. UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED WAIVERS

Despite the arguments above, the Board or the courts may determine that
a provision for mandatory and .exclusive arbitration of statutory claims
relates to the scope of the arbitration procedure and thus constitutes a
mandatory subject of bargaining. While in most cases, classification of a
subject as mandatory carries with it the right to implement unilaterally when
bargaining impasse is reached, there are exceptions. For several reasons, the
employer could not implement a proposal to arbitrate statutory claims over
the union's objection. First, because arbitration requires consent, it cannot be
unilaterally imposed at impasse.138 Second, where, as here, a proposed
provision constitutes a waiver, it cannot be imposed unilaterally, for a waiver
requires consent as well.139 Like the right to strike, the right to litigate cannot
136 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO Sr. J. DISP. REsoL. 19, 41 (1999); Lisa B.
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial
Review ofEmployment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 242 (1998); Lisa
B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: Differences between Repeat Player and Nonrepeat
Player Outcomes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, INDUS.
RELATIONSREsEARCHASS'N201, 202, 207 (1997).
137 Voluntary post-dispute arbitration of individual statutory claims does not
sufficiently implicate mandatory subjects of bargaining to require union participation in
negotiation of such agreements. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
138 See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1991);
McClatchy Newspapers v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1997); NLRB v.
McClatchy Newspapers, 964 F.2d 1153, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Edwards, J., concurring).
139 See McClatchy Newspapers, 131 F.3d at 1031 (indicating that an employer could
not impose a no-strike provision because the strike is a fundamental right which requires
a specific contractual waiver).
-
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be waived by the union except by a clear and unequivocal waiver.140 Thus,
even if deemed a mandatory bargaining subject, the waiver cannot be
accomplished by unilateral imposition of a contract provision after impasse.
The inability of the employer to implement an exclusive statutory
arbitration system after impasse does not, however, eliminate the adverse
impact on the bargaining process that would be caused by finding a waiver to
be a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although implementation would be
prohibited, the employer could still insist to impasse that such a waiver be
included in any contract, and the union would be forced to agree, take
economic action, or continue without any agreement. The employees would
still be deprived of the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement unless
they waived their right to litigate statutory claims. While the waiver could
not be unilaterally imposed, the employees would either have to live with no
agreement or strike. Thus, the collective bargaining process and labor peace
would still be frustrated by the injection of the statutory waiver into
negotiations.

V. BARGAINING FOR INDIVIDUAL WAIVERS
In the ALPA case, the court of appeals, after concluding that arbitration
of statutory claims was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, upheld the
employer's right to impose arbitration on individual employees.141 The
district court, however, found the subject mandatory and prohibited employer
imposition of the arbitration requirement. Regardless of the classification of
waivers as a bargaining subject, the question of whether the National Labor
Relations Act permits the employer to bypass the union and impose waivers
on the employees that the union represents must be answered. While the
EEOC has taken the position that such agreements are inconsistent with
discrimination laws, 142 many courts have upheld them, 143 and the NLRB has
not directly ruled on the question.
140 See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
141 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, 199 F.3d 477, 485-86 (1999).
142 The EEOC opposes imposition of such waivers as a condition of employment.
EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging, No. CIV.A.H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
19, 1995); EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a
Condition ofEmployment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7511 (July 7, 1997) (setting forth
EEOC opposition to mandatory arbitration). The EEOC has participated as amicus in
cases raising the issue, arguing that employees cannot be compelled to enter into
predispute arbitration agreements. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 937
(4th Cir. 1999).
143 E.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (I Ith Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991).
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A. The NLRB General Counsel's Position on C<?mpulsory Arbitration
In 1995, the NLRB General Counsel; in response to a request for advice
from an NLRB Regional Director; took the position that mandatory
arbitration agreements in the nonunion context violate the Act. 144 The issue
submitted for advice in Bentley's Luggage Corp. was whether the employer
violated the statute by requiring employees to agree to arbitrate employment
claims before· seeking redress in any other forum, and by firing the charging
party for refusal to sign the agreement. 145 Since the employees in Bentley's
were not represented by ,a union, the issue addressed was not whether the
agreement was a mandatory subject of bargaining, but rather whether it could
be lawfully imposed on nonunion employees under threat of termination.1 46
The General Counsel authorized a complaint, absent settlement, alleging that
the action violated sections 8(a)(l) and (4) because it required the employees
to waive their statutory right to file charges with. the Board. The
memorandum relied upon the early Supreme Court decision in National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 147 holding that contracts used to frµstrate statutory
rights are unlawful. 148 The memorandum went on to note that the Board has
subsequently held that employers and unions violate the Act by insisting that
employees waive either their right to file unfair labor practice charges or
their right to use contractual grievance and arbitration procedures.149
Although the arbitration agreement at issue could be broadly read to waive
the right to pursue any statutory claim without first arbitrating, the focus of
the General Counsel was on the waiver of the right to bring charges to the
NLRB. Thus, the General Counsel asserted a violation of section 8(a)(4),
which prohibits discrimination against employees for filing charges or giving
testimony under the Act. 150 The General Counsel reasoned that the provision

I44 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) ~ 34208, at 212 (Aug. 21, 1995), available' at 1995 N.L.R.B.
GCM LEXIS 92 (1995).
145 Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *l.
146 Id.
147 Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
148 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997. Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *6-7.
149 Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *7-8 (citing, inter alia,
Kolman/Athey Div. of Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92 (1991) and Vazquez, 265
N.L.R.B. 602 (1982)).
150 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24
N.L.R.B. Advice Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM
LEXIS 92, at *9.
.
.
.
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was enacted to protect employee rights to report unfair labor practices and
the arbitration agreement interfered with that purpose.151
The employer argued that the Gilmer casel52 privileged the agreement,
but the General Counsel found the case inapplicable.153 First, Gilmer permits
enforceable arbitration agreements for statutory claims only where the statute
does not evidence an intent to preclude waiver of judicial remedies.154 The
General Counsel read the Act as giving enforcement authority to the Board
regardless of other remedies available.155 Further, the General Counsel noted
that the EEOC could pursue an age discrimination claim (the subject of the
waiver in Gilmer) without the filing of a charge by the employee, but the
Board has no such authority.156 Thus a waiver by the employee precludes
enforcement of the statute.157 While the rationale in Bentley's supports a
conclusion that insistence on a waiver of the right to file NLRB charges
would violate the Act, the General Counsel's specific reliance on the
National Labor Relations Act provides little guidance with respect to waivers
of other statutory claims.158
Arguably, the Board should not be concerned with waiver of a judicial
forum for claims under other statutes by either union or nonunion employees.
Instead, determination of the legality of such waivers should be left to the
151 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *9-10.
152 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
153 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *11.
154 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213-14, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at
*13 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29).
155 Bentley's Luggage, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 214, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *13.
The General Counsel also noted that Gilmer involved enforcement of an arbitration
agreement already signed, not whether an effort to obtain such an agreement was lawful.
Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *14.
156 Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *14.
157 The Memorandum also noted that since employees were at-will, the arbitration
agreement did not clearly provide a basis to challenge a termination proscribed by the
statute. Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *15. In addition, the General
Counsel rejected the employer's claim that the agreement did not bar unfair labor practice
charges, noting that the right to file charges after arbitration was illusory, given the sixmonth statute of limitations and the requirement that employees not only refrain from
initiating actions, but dismiss actions already commenced. Id., available at 1995
N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92, at *15-18.
158 Of course, the Advice Memorandum is not a decision of the Board and thus does
not have the force of Jaw in any event. The Bentley's case settled prior to litigation.
Bentley's Luggage Corp., 96 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA} 15 (May 17, 1996).
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enforcement agencies and courts interpreting those statutes. Further, as noted
by the General Counsel, with respect to at least the discrimination statutes the
consequences of such a waiver are different, since the NLRB can act only
after filing of a charge, while the EEOC can initiate its own charges.159
Accordingly, the waiver would not completely preclude statutory
enforcement in the discrimination context. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the
EEOC rarely files suit and there are perils to acting without evidence from a
charging party or parties.160 An additional difference is that the EEPC may
be able to litigate a claim after filing of a charge, even if the employee who
filed the charge is precluded from litigating in the judicial forum.161 Since
the individual has no right to litigate under the NLRA under any
circumstance, if an arbitration agreement did not preclude the filing of a
charge or litigation by the agency, then it would have no effect.162
159 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994) (''The Secretary may
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of the unpaid
minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated
damages."); Procedure for the Prevention of Unlawful Employment Practices, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.11 (2000) (authorizing EEOC Commissioners to file charges with the agency);
Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 n.3 (1967) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160(a)-(b) (1994), which notes the NLRB's limited authority).
160 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The case of EEOC v. Sears Roebuck
Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), illustrates some of the difficulties of proceeding
without a charge filed by an employee or applicant. In Sears, the EEOC presented only
statistical evidence supporting its claim of discrimination, without anecdotal evidence of
instances of discrimination. Id. at 310-12. While not fatal to the claim, the absence of
such evidence was an important factor in the court's decision that the EEOC did not
prove discrimination. Id. at 311-12.
161 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991), the Court
indicated that the employee could still file a charge with the EEOC despite the arbitration
agreement. Several circuit courts have permitted the EEOC to litigate cases despite the
employee's arbitration agreement, although some h_ave restricted the relief available in
such cases. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 813 (4th Cir. 1999)
(permitting EEOC to proceed despite arbitration agreement, but precluding relief for
individual employee who signed arbitration agreement); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery &
Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 468 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that EEOC could litigate despite
employee's arbitration agreement with no limit on relief available).
162 The NLRB has not decided the effect of such individual arbitrati~n agreements,
as the Bentley's Luggage case settled. However, the Board does defer to arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements in which unfair labor practice claims and contract
claims overlap, reserving jurisdiction to insure that the resolution is not repugnant to the
statute. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). ''The Board's authority, in
its discretion, to defer to the arbitration process has never been questioned by the courts
of appeals, or by the Supreme Court." Id. at 840. However, the deferral is discretionary.
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating unfair labor
practice charges even though they might have been the subject of an arbitration
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These distinctions, however, may not warrant differential treatment of
NLRA claims and discrimination claims in the context of compulsory
arbitration of statutory claims. Depending on the language used, the
arbitration agreement may discourage employees from filing charges under
either statute based on the belief that the only recourse is arbitration. And the
very low rate of EEOC litigation provides no realistic opportunity for a
judicial forum for discrimination claims in which an arbitration agreement
has been executed. In contrast, the NLRB finds merit in about one-third of
the charges filed with the agency.163 While many are not litigated, once a
determination of merit is made, the cases are either litigated or settled with
relieffor the charging party.164

B .. The Impact on Mandatory Bargaining Subjects Requires
Negotiation
While the argument that classification as a permissive subject leaves the
employer free to negotiate and implement a waiver individually has some
persuasive force, a closer examination of the issue leads to the opposite
conclusion. A brief review of the law relating to individual bargaining is
instructive. In J.I Case Co. v. NLRB,165 the Court held that individual
contracts could not be used to defeat collective bargaining.166 While the
employer is free to hire employees, the terms of employment are set by the
collective bargaining agreement.167
proceeding and award. Section tO(a) of the Act expressly makes this plain, and the
courts have uniformly so held. However, it is equally well established that the Board
has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration award and decline to exercise its
authority over alleged unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental
aims of the Act.
Id. at 840 (quoting Int'l Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962)); see also
Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). "Clearly, agreements
between private parties cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the Board. Therefore, we believe
the Board may exercise jurisdiction in any case of an unfair labor practice when in its
discretion its interference is necessary to protect the public rights defined in the Act." Id
at 1090 (quoting NLRB v. Walt Disney, 146 F.2d 44, 48 (1945)). It might be argued that
the General Counsel's position in Bentley's Luggage is inconsistent with the deferral
doctrine, so long as the employee is not prevented from filing a charge to invoke the
Board's review of the arbitration decision.
163 Fact Sheet on the National Labor Relations Board (Jan. 8, 2001), at
http://www.nlrb.gov/facts.htrnl (stating that about one-third of charges filed are found to
have merit).
164 Id. (stating over 90% of meritorious cases are settled).
165 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321U.S.322 (1944).
166 Id. at 341-42.
167 Id. at 335-36.
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Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify their
execution.or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the
procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to
collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly
ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they ·be used to forestall bargaining or
to limit or condition the terms of .the collective agreement. "The Board
asserts a public right vested in it as a public body charged in the public
interest with the duty of preventing ,unfair labor practices." Wherever ·
private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the
Act.would be reduced to a futility.168 · ·
The employer is prohibited from bypassing the union and negotiating
directly with the employees, even where employees consent, because it
subverts the statutory purpose of encouraging collective bargaining.169 The
J.L Case court suggested, however, that the contract itself could leave areas
for individual bargaining, by prescribing minimum wages and allowing
negotiation for higher wages, for example.170
In National Licorice Co., I'71 the Court also addressed the issue of
individual contracts. 172 There the employer negQtiated individual agreements
through an employer:-dominated labor org?Jlization that waived employee
rights to demand a cfosed shop and a collective bargaining agreement, and to
arbitrate discharge claims.173 The contracts provided an alternative to
arbitration for employee discharges that consisted of a challenge presented
directly to the employer.174 The Court upheld the Board's conclusion that
these contracts violated the statute, finding that the arbitration provision
"forestall[ed] collective bargaining with r~spect to discharged emp)oyees" by
discouraging, if not barring, presentation of discharge grievances through a
union.175
Where bargaining over a subject is not mandatory, however, the
employer is not precluded from making ~ilateral changes, even in existing
contracts.176 By implication, at least, the employer could also negotiate
directly with employees.over permissive subjects of bargaining~ as the court
l68 Id. at 337 (quoting Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940)).
169 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321U.S.678, 684-85, 687 (1944);
170 J.L Case, 321 U.S. at 338.
171 Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 3,?0 (1940).
172 Id. at 354-55.
173 Id. at 360.
114 Id.

175 Id.
176 Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 185-86 (1971). However, such action may unlawfully breach the
agreement. Id. at 188.
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of appeals in ALPA so held.177 An exploration of the impact of such
negotiations in the instant case, however, reveals that the waiver is so
intertwined with mandatory subjects that individual negotiations without
union consent should be barred. First, the waiver is nonmandatory, not
because it does not relate to terms and conditions of employment, but
because of the possible frustration of the bargaining process that would result
from finding it a mandatory subject.178 In fact, it does relate to terms and
conditions of employment. Second, it is not purely a waiver of a claim
between the employee and the employer, but an agreement to an internal
method of resolving the dispute.179 The union unquestionably has an interest
in negotiating the method of dispute resolution, particularly when, as here,
the dispute relates to terms and conditions of employment and
nondiscrimination in the workplace, and the Board has so held.180 Third, the
waiver has such a significant impact on terms and conditions of employment
that unilateral implementation and individual bargaining must be
prohibited.181
Where a subject of bargaining would otherwise be permissive, it may
become mandatory when it is so intertwined with a mandatory subject of
bargaining that it vitally affects the terms and conditions of employment of

177 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 486
(1999). The analysis herein might apply to permissive bargaining subjects more broadly,
suggesting that if an employer desires to bargain about a permissive subject, it must
bargain with the union, not the employees. However, further discussion of this theory is
beyond the scope of the article.
178 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
179 This distinguishes the instant situation from Phillips Pipe Line Co., 302 N.L.R.B.
732, 732 (1991), where the Board found, under the unique circumstances of the case, that
the union was not entitled to demand bargaining over a release requirement that
accompanied an offer of enhanced severance pay. In that case, the Board did not find that
the release was so intertwined with the severance that bargaining was required. The
release, however, related to preexisting claims, not future claims, and participation in the
program was purely voluntary, with no loss of contractual benefits if the employee
refused to sign the release.
180 See Heck's, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1121 (1989) (finding employer violated
section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally imposing on employees a grievance procedure separate
from the negotiated procedure). The same analysis would apply to other statutory claims,
such as claims for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207
(1994), or claims for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601
(1994).
18l What is likely to occur in this situation is unilateral implementation, rather than
individual bargaining, because the efficiency and cost savings the employer seeks to
achieve by arbitration are maximized by establishing a uniform procedure applicable to
all employees. Estreicher, supra note 133, at 1358-59.
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the employees. In Star Tribune, 182 the Board found that hiring discrimination
had such a direct impact on the ~ion's ability to eliminate w9rkplace
discrimination that the union was entitled to information.that would enable it
to investigate whether such discrimination was occurring, despite the fact
that hiring procedures relate to non-bargaining unit members and thus are
normally non-mandatory bargaining subjects.183 Similarly here, the impact of
the waiver on mandatory bargaining subjects is so significant that neither
unilateral implementation nor individual bargaining should be permitted. 184
To understand this impact, it is helpful to consider the possible outcomes
of negotiation with individual employees (or unilateral implementation). If
the employer were to implement a requirement that employees arbitrate
statutory claims, an arbitration procedure would have to be established. One
alternative would be inclusion of statutory .claims in the collectively
bargained grievance procedure. It seems beyond debate that such an
alternative would require the consent of the union.185 Accordingly, it could
not be implemented unilaterally or individually negotiated with the employee
absent union agreement. The other alternative is a separate procedure for
arbitration of statutory claims. The arbitration procedure would be a
mandatory subject of bargaining becaus~ it is a dispute resolution mechanism
that settles terms and conditions of employment. While it might initially
appear that the waiver could be separated from the procedure for negotiation
purposes,186 further analysis reveals that it is not the case. Negotiation of the
waiver requires establishment of procedures, and the interrelationship
between this exclusive arbitration obligation and the contractual rights and
procedures mandates a conclusion that the union. must be involved in both
the decision to require statutory arbitration and the procedures to be utilized.
The primary issues likely to be included in an arbitration procedure for
statutory claims are complaints of discrimination on the basis of gender, race,

182 Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543 (1989).
l83 Id. at 548.

184 However, this conclusion does not convert the waiver to a mandatory bargaining
subject. See Borden, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 396, 399 (1986). The waiver is non-mandatory,
not because it has no impact on terms and conditions of employment, but because
injection of waiver issues into the collective bargaining process frustrates the process by
allowing one party to condition bargaining on waiver of a statutory right unrelated to the
statutory objectives of collective bargaining and labor peace.
185 See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1991);
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131F.3d1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1997); NLRB v.
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1153, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
186 See Phillips Pipe Line Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 732, 737 (1991).
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religion, national origin, age, and disability. 187 Yet most collective
bargaining agreements also prohibit discrimination as a matter of contract,
and many refer to discrimination statutes in a way that does not constitute an
exclusive agreement to arbitrate statutory claims under the contract.188 There
would be obvious overlap between a claim under the statutory procedure and
one under the contractual procedure. Indeed, the statutory claims might be
arbitrable under both.189 Moreover, discrimination and other legal claims are
most likely to involve discharges190 and virtually every collective bargaining
agreement contains a requirement of cause for termination that is subject to
the grievance and arbitration procedure.191 Other issues likely to be the
subject of discrimination claims, such as demotions and other discipline, 192
disputes over pay rates,193 and denials of promotion,194 will also typically be

187 Also included are state statutory claims, other federal statutory claims such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act or the Family Medical Leave Act, or common law claims such
as discrimination for filing a workers compensation claim. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001); Lingle v. Norge Div. Of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988); Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212, 220 {1985). For a thorough
discussion of preemption and arbitration agreements, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration ofIndividual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract ofthe
1990s, 73 DENY. U.L. REV. 1017 (1996).
188 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
l89 Parties to contractual arbitration procedures can authorize arbitrators to decide
statutory claims. Harry Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The 'Common
Law ofthe Shop' v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 79 (1977).
190 John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (finding that 59% of
employment discrimination suits alleged unlawful discharge); Peter Siegelman & John J.
Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg from its Tip: A Comparison of Published and
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1133, 1164
(1990) (noting that most of the growth in employment discrimination litigation has been
in lawsuits alleging discriminatory discharge).
191 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 884, 887 (stating both that 94% of
collective bargaining agreements contain a just cause provision and that a significant
percentage of arbitration cases involve discharge or discipline); COOPER, supra note 2, at
258 (indicating that labor arbitrators hear more discipline and discharge cases than any
other type of case and that arbitrators commonly infer protection from unjust termination
even where the contract does not provide it expressly). Discrimination in a broad sense is
often an issue in arbitration cases involving discharge because just cause has been
interpreted to require "industrial equal protection." Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan,
Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 85 DUKE L.J. 594, 621
(1985); see ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 934-38.
192 See supra note 190; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 780-84.
l93 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 686-90, 739, 785-89 (citing cases).
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covered by the collective bargaining agreement, 195 and are mandatory
bargaining subjects.196 Because of the substantial overlap between
contractual issues and statutory issues, the procedures governing arbitrations
of statutory issues, and the arbitrations themselves, will impact the
contractual arbitration procedure and arbitrations thereunder.
Like the alternative procedure in National Licorice Co., 197 the statutory
procedure may discourage employees from using the contractual procedure
to vindicate their rights. 198 Certainly, any requirement that the employees
waive their right to file a contractual grievance by filing a claim under the
statutory procedure would have such a substantial impact on the contractual
grievance procedure that it could not be implemented without union input.199
In addition, even if the statutory arbitration agreement makes clear that
employees remain free to use b.oth procedures for overlapping claims, the
statutory process may affect the contractual process in several significant
ways. The statutory arbitration procedure required, as· well as the number of
other claims pending under each procedure, may determine which case is
194 Id. at 775-79, 845-83. Gender and age have arisen in the context of promotion
and job selection arbitrations often enough to be separately discussed in this
comprehensive treatise on labor arbitration. Id. at 875-78, 880-82.
195 Specific harassment provision~ are less common, but harassment claims may be
arbitrated under discrimination provisions of the agreement.. Mary K. O'Melveny,
Negotiating the Minefields: Selected Issues for Labor Unions Addressing Sexual
Harassment Complaints by Represented Employees, 15 LAB. LAW. 321, 350 (2000)
(suggesting that unions negotiate contractual prohibitions on harassment and retaliation);
Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation
Dilemma for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 7 (1999) (indicating that number of
contract provisions expressly prohibiting harassment is likely to increase). Labor
arbitrators hear cases involving discipline for harassment, cases involving
accommodation of religious beliefs, and cases involving accommodation of individuals
with disabilities. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 2, at 1056-73, 792-94.
196 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1994); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 864-82, 887-89,
893-96 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992).
197 Nat'l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940).
198 See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
199 Indeed, conditioning employment on prospective waiver of the right to grieve
under the collectively bargained procedure might well be found unlawful. See Retlaw
Broad. Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 984, 993 (1993) (finding unlawful employer's conditioning of
reemployment on waiver of the NLRA's section 7 rights). See also Kolman/Athey Div.
of Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92, 96 (1991) (finding election of remedies
provision to be non-mandatory subject of bargaining). Similarly, it might be argued that
conditioning employment on waiver of the right to litigate in general might violate
section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA because it coerces employees in the exercise of their right to
engage in concerted activity. This theory depends on the interpretation of concerted
activity and would apply not only in the union setting, but also in the nonunion setting.
Further analysis of this theory is beyond the scope of this article.
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heard first. The parties in the second proceeding may be faced with
arguments that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of some or
all of the issues before the arbitrator.200 Although contractual arbitration
decisions do not bind future arbitrators,201 a contractual arbitrator may look
to a decision by a statutory arbitrator in interpreting overlapping issues,
either in the same case or similar cases.202 Thus, arbitration of a statutory
claim may have greater implications for contractual interpretation than
litigation (and may be more likely to occur).203
If the statutory arbitration occurs first, the union may be faced with
issues of collateral estoppel in the collectively bargained procedure.204
Alternatively, if the contractual arbitration proceeds first, the employee and
employer in the statutory procedure will face collateral estoppel issues. This
potential for collateral estoppel may discourage the employee from
participating in the contractual procedure, which is under the control of the
union, out of concern that it may have an adverse effect on the statutory
claim.205 Such a decision would not prevent the union from proceeding, but
would certainly hamper its ability to prevail and therefore adversely affect
the union's ability to enforce the collective bargaining agreement.206 Given
200

See Timothy J. Heinsz, Grieve It Again: Of Stare Decisis, Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel in Labor Arbitration, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 275 (1997). This problem may
be especially significant if the exclusive arbitration agreement purports to require
arbitration, rather than litigation, of class claims. Statutory and contractual rights of
employees represented by the union may be arbitrated without a mechanism for their
participation or protection, and later attempts to assert those rights may be barred. For a
thorough discussion of class actions and arbitration see Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 1 (2000).
201 See Heinsz, supra note 200, at 286-87.
202 Id. at 288-90, 293-94 (indicating that most arbitrators are inclined to follow
earlier awards on the same issue in the absence of unusual circumstances dictating a
different decision).
203 See Clark, supra note 134, at 177 (stating that the availability and lower cost of
arbitration may encourage more employees to file claims against the employer); Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL. J. 189, 189-90 (1997) (stating the same).
204 Of course, application of collateral estoppel may benefit the union and employee
in the contractual procedure if the employee prevails, but this only further supports the
need for negotiation.
205 An employee's attorney might well advise the employee to avoid participation in
the contractual procedure or attempt to persuade the union not to proceed with the
grievance.
206 This is precisely the sort of effect that concerned the Court in National Licorice
and Member Stephens in Kolman/Athey. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78, 17175.
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the potential impact of statutory arbitration on contractual claims, the union
has a strong interest in insuring that if there is a statutory arbitration
procedure, it is a fair procedure likely to. yield unbiased and accurate
decisions. If the arbitrator is not neutral or the employee has no right to
discover necessary information relevant to the claim,~07 a decision that
adversely affects the union's ability to eliminate workplace discrimination,
both a mandatory bargaining subject and legal obligation,208 might issue.209
Collective bargaining negotiations about· whether to have a statutory
procedure and the form of the procedure could address the application of
collateral estoppeI.210 But the potential for adver!le impact on collectively
bargained rights requires union involvement in negotiation of both the
arbitration requirement and the arbitration procedure.
The union also may have a strong interest in remedies available under the
statutory procedure, because they may impact collectively bargained rights.
For example, an order of promotion may impact the seniority rights of other
employees in the bargaining unit.211 If the union is not a party to the
proceedings, it cannot assert the rights of other employees or the possible
conflict with the collective bargaining agreement. In court, the union could
207 See, e.g., Hooters ofAm., Inc., 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to compel
arbitration of statutory claim because of the unfairness of the procedure).
208 Unions, like employers, have legal obligations not to discriminate on the basis of
race, gender, religion, national origin, age, ~d disability. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994)
(proscribing discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion); 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)
(1994) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2),
12112(a)-{b) (1994) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of disability). Some courts
have imposed on the union a duty to protect employees from employer discrimination.
E.g., Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir.
1978); Macklin v. Spector ·Freight Sys., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1987) (finding the union liable for
race discrimination for refusing to file discrimination grievances despite an absence of
union racial animus). For discussion of union nondiscrimination obligations, see Note,
Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1980); Ann C.
Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 567, 579-87 (1994).
209 It is not a sufficient answer to say that the employee could refuse to arbitrate if
the procedure was unfair. The employee might not refuse because of the cost oflitigation,
and an employee who tried to avoid arbitration in favor of litigation might be
unsuccessful. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991).
210 Heinsz, supra note 200, at 286-87.
211 See, e.g., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of Rubber &
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 769-72 (1983) (finding that employer who resisted
compliance with labor arbitration award violated the seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement, since the agreement conflicted with conciliation agreement entered
into to resolve discrimination litigation).
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be joined as a party to help resolve these issues.212 In arbitration, the
statutory arbitration procedure would determine the role of the union, and if
the employer unilaterally imposed the agreement on the employees, rights
under the collective bargaining agreement might be affected without any
mechanism for union participation.213 Again, this demonstrates the
interrelationship of statutory and contractual arbitration.
A statutory arbitration procedure also might contain provisions that
prevent the union from obtaining information about discrimination against
bargaining unit members. Indeed, one of the employer interests in preferring
arbitration over litigation is confidentiality. 214 A union's inability to obtain
such information might interfere with its ability to represent other employees
and to eliminate discrimination from the workplace.215 Not only is
discrimination a mandatory subject of bargaining, but the union has a legal
duty of nondiscrimination both under the NLRA and the federal
antidiscrimination statutes.2 16 Precluding the union from participation in the
212 Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 717 F.2d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983)
(noting union intervention at remedial stage in case involving impact of reinstatement of
discriminatorily-discharged flight attendants upon seniority of existing workers
represented by union).
2 13 Such a result could create difficulties similar to those faced in W.R. Grace, 461
U.S. at 771-72, in which the union's action to enforce an arbitration award reached the
Supreme Court because the employer had entered a conciliation agreement in a
discrimination action, without union participation, which conflicted with the collective
bargaining agreement.
214 Clark, supra note 134, at 177.
21 5 See Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 549, 551 (1989) (requiring employer to
provide union with information relevant to alleged hiring discrimination because of
impact on union efforts to eliminate workplace discrimination).
216 See supra notes 207-09. Both the NLRB and the courts have read section
8(b)(l)(A) to encompass a duty of fair representation which precludes unions from
discriminating in negotiations and handling of grievances. See NLRB v. Local 106, Glass
Bottle Blowers Assoc., 520 F.2d 693, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding Board's
decision requiring two local unions segregated on basis of sex to merge and to
discontinue practice of segregated handling of grievances based on sex, since practice
violated section 8(b)(l)(A)); NLRB v. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local No. 1581, 489
F.2d 635, 638 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding Boards' decision that union must discontinue
negotiating preferences in hiring based on citizenship and residence of prospective
employee's family that were in violation of section 8(b)(l)(A)); Agosto v. Corr. Officers
Benevolent Assoc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying summary
judgment to union which offered no explanation for refusal to process sexual harassment
claim, demonstrating that union may have committed sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII and thereby may have breached its duty of fair representation); Seep v.
Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that
sex discrimination which violates Title VII may also breach the duty of fair
representation, but finding no such discrimination in the case).
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decision about whether to require arbitration of statutory claims ~d the
implementation of a statutory arbitration procedure would interfere with its
ability to fulfill this duty.
Permitting the employer to bypass the union and neg!)tiate directly with
the employees for such a procedure, or to impose it as a condition of
employment, undermines the uniqn in the eyes of th~ employees. Like the
procedure for standardless, discretionary merit increases in McClatchy
Newspapers, unilateral institution of a dispute resolution procedure that
impacts the collectively bargained griev~nce and arbitration procedure, and
may well impact other terms and conditi~~s of employment, diminishes the
union's representative role, resulting in a de-collectivization ofbargaining.217
The fact that the union may have no role in litjgation of statutory claims does
not vitiate the need for the union to have a role in· an internal dispute
resolution procedure that affects terms and conditions of employment in
order to preserve its role as a collective bargaining agent. The limited role of
the union in the former procedure is attributable to Congress, and will not be
viewed as a sign of the union's ineffectivene~s as a collective bargaining
representative, wliile the latter well might.
·
In addition, permitting the employer to negotiate individually with
employees for a statutory procedure for arbitration claims undermines
majority rule. In Emporium Capwell Co. v.. Western Addition Community
Organization,218 the Supreme Court found that concerted activity by
minority members. of the bargaining unit to pressure the employer to address
discrimination claims outside the grievance and arbitration process as
unprotected.219 The Court was concerned with the negative impact on the
principle of majority rule and the collective bargaining process that would
result from permitting employees to bypass the collectively bargained
procedure for resolving discrimination complaints to deal directly with the
employer.220 This concern is equally present when it is the employer who
seeks to bypass the majority representative and deal directly with the
employees on discrimination complaints. Moreover, should the individual
employees desire to act collectively to negotiat~ with the employer or to
resist employer efforts to impose a statutory arbitration procedure, the
rationale of Emporium Capwell would deprive them of protection by the Act,
rendering them subject to termination or other retaliation by the employer.
217 McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1386, 1391 (1996); enforced, 131
F.3d 1026, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Toledo Blade Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 626, 628-33
(1989) (Stephens, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom., Toledo Typographical Union No. 63 v.
NLRB, 907 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
218 Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
21 9 Id. at 70.
220 Id. at 62-68.
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This completes the decollectivization of the relationship because the
employer can bypass the union and prevent the employees from acting
collectively as well.
One might argue that the problems cited above are the effects of a
decision to implement a statutory arbitration procedure, and can be dealt with
by requiring the employer to bargain with the union over the effects of the
decisions, but not the decision itself.22 1 However, this ignores the effect of
decollectivization of the bargaining relationship. In addition, cases involving
effects bargaining exempt the decision from bargaining because of its
entrepreneurial aspects.222 The employer's interests in unencumbered
decision making, secrecy, flexibility, and speed outweigh any benefit to
bargaining over the decision despite its impact on terms and conditions of
employment.223 An examination of those interests here establishes that
exempting the decision from bargaining is not required. The employer's
interests in confining disputes to arbitration include cost, speed, and
confidentiality.224 Cost is not an employer interest that has been given
substantial weight in avoiding bargaining.225 While confidentiality may be
desirable from the employer's point of view, keeping statutory violations
secret cannot justify allowing unilateral imposition of arbitration.226 Speed of
decision-making supports a limitation on bargaining but, unlike the decisions
exempted from bargaining, such as partial closure of facilities, speedy
decisions on statutory discrimination claims do not further preservation of
22 1 I am grateful to Professor Samuel Estreicher for suggesting this analogy at the
Symposium.
222 See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
223 Id. at 682-83.
224 Clark, supra note 134, at 176-77.
225 Cost would always favor a determination that bargaining is not required.
Moreover, one aspect of the cost reduction derives from the prediction that arbitrators
will be less likely to award punitive damages. Clark, supra note 134, at 176. Relief from
liability for statutory violations is similarly an interest that should not be given weight in
avoiding negotiations.
226 Indeed, the critics of arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution generally,
have focused on the private nature of arbitration, arguing that it is inappropriate and
contrary to public justice values to privatize litigation of statutory claims. See, e.g.,
Malin, supra note 2, at 594-97; Joseph D. Garrison, Pro: The Employee's Perspective:
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes Little More Than a Waiver of a Worker's
Rights, DISP. REsOL. J., Fall 1997, at 15, 18; Stone, supra note 187, at 1046-47
(collecting comments of various critics); Irving R. Kaufman, Refonn for a System in
Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 29
(1990). See also Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A
Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers
Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1238 (1993) (arguing for de novo review of
arbitral decisions on discrimination claims to preserve public justice values).
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capital investment or continuation of the ~usiness. Thus, the value of
bargaining outweighs the burdens on the employer.227
A second argument that bargaining is not required flows from the
imposition of arbitration agreements at the time of hire. Since the applicants
agreeing to arbitration are not employees, the union does not represent them
and cannot bargain for their terms and conditions of hire. As noted in J.L
Case,228 however, once the applicants become employees their terms and
conditions of employment are governed by the union contract.229 Whatever
contract the employer negotiated with them must yield to the bargaining
requirements of the statute. Furthermore, while hiring procedures are
generally outside the scope of mandatory bargaining; when they impact the
terms and conditions of employment of the employees, bargaining will be
required.230 Here, as established above, arbitration of statutory claims will
impact the terms and conditions of employment of the employees, for such
arbitration will not take place until the individual becomes an employee, and
will, with the possible exception of disputes over hiring discrimination,
involve disputes that arise from employment.· The employer could not
negotiate a different wage rate with an employee in hiring and argue that the
union had no interest because it does not represent 4tpplicants. Neither can it
negotiate an arbitration procedure that applies after hiring, unless it is
privileged to negotiate such an agreement with existing employees.231
Finally, it might be suggested that both litigatipn of statutory
discrimination claims under procedures imposed by law and voluntary postdispute arbitration of individual discrimination claims have a similar impact
227 A detennination that bargaining over the decision to impose statutory arbitration
is not required, however, would not vitiate the argtiments herein that bargaining over the
effects, the statutory arbitration procedure, is mandated.
228 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
229 Id. at 335-37.
230 See United States Postal Serv., 308 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1308 {1992) (holding that
employer is required to bargain about hiring practices when union has an objective basis
for believing that the process may be discriminatory), enforcement denied, 18 F.3d 1089,
1092 (3d Cir. 1994) (agreeing with Board finding of unfair labor practice but refusing to
enforce affirmative portion of remedial order because of detennination that, as a matter of
fact, the new hiring procedure did not have discriminatory impact), remanded, 314
N.L.R.B. 901, 901 (1994) (accepting Court's decision and modifying remedial order to
eliminate affirmative requirement that employer bargain and supply the information not
previously supplied); Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 549, 551 (1989) (holding that
employer must provide the union with information relevant to alleged sex discrimination
in hiring because possible discrimination in the hiring process is so intertwined with
possible discrimination in employment that to bar union investigation of the hiring
process impairs its ability to eliminate discrimination in employment).
231 See United States Postal Serv., 308 N.L.R.B. at 1308.
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on mandatory subjects. Since there is no requirement of union involvement
in statutory litigation or settlement, including agreements to alternative
dispute resolution methods of settlement, the employer should be able to
implement a mandatory statutory arbitration procedure without union input.
Clearly, litigation and individual settlement of statutory claims may impact
the union's ability to eliminate workplace discrimination. That impact,
however, is dictated by the statutes. In addition, some of the effects on
contractual rights are less likely to occur as a result oflitigation. Where cases
are actually litigated, rather than settled, information about the employer's
discrimination will be publicly available and therefore accessible to the union
to further its efforts to eliminate discrimination. Because of the relative speed
of arbitration as compared to litigation,232 the collateral estoppel issues are
less likely to arise where claims are litigated. And, as noted, the opportunity
to join the union as a party exists in the judicial forum. The impact of
exclusive arbitration of statutory claims on the collective bargaining process,
including arbitration, is quite different and significant.
The effect of voluntary post-dispute arbitration is also significantly
different. It is the cumulative effect of mandatory arbitration of all statutory
claims that poses risks to the collectively bargained terms and conditions of
employment. The inability to obtain information about discrimination in one
particular case will not substantially affect the union's ability to remedy
workplace discrimination, but the inability to access such information about
any case will. Similarly, the impact of the collateral estoppel effects increases
when all statutory cases are arbitrated because the union may well face a
collateral estoppel argument in large numbers of arbitration cases, not only
discrimination cases but also just cause cases and others in which the
employee contractual right is unrelated to discrimination.233 Similarly, the
potential effect of remedial provisions on collectively bargained rights
increases with the number of cases arbitrated. 234 Accordingly, where the
employer desires to bring the statutory claims into a workplace dispute
resolution procedure that impacts on terms and conditions of employment,
the employer should not be permitted to do so unilaterally.
232 Clark, supra note 134, at 176; Malin, supra note 2, at 593 (quoting Paul Tobias,
"an icon of the plaintiffs' bar").
233 See supra notes 186-96 and accompanying text, discussing the substantial
potential for overlapping claims. In addition, arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement does not preclude judicial litigation of a discrimination claim. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 43, 47, 59-60 (1974). But see Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 2d 320, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
23 4 The union may litigate one case like W.R. Grace, but may have insufficient
resources to litigate many. Therefore, it is essential that the union negotiate a right to
intervene at the arbitral stage to protect employee rights.
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VI. THEFu'ruRE OF ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS IN THE
UNIONIZED WORKPLACE

Advocates of workplace arbitration of statutory claims need not fear that
this interpretation sounds the death knell for arbitration of statutory claims in
the unionized workplace. 235 It merely requires that the employer obtain the
agreement of the union (and if the union cannot waive employee rights, of
the employees) to arbitration of statutory claims. A union and employer
could agree to arbitrate statutory claims under the collectively bargained
procedure or under a separate procedure. The sep!lfate procedure qould be
negotiated to best serve the interests of the employer and the employees in
the particular workplace. A union uninterested in negotiating the d~tails of a
statutory arbitration agreement could authorize the e:qiployer to deal directly
·
with the employ~es or applicants.236
Negotiation with the union may provide some· aclvantages for the
employer. Employees may be more willing to buy into a procedure
negotiated by their representative, and therefore, to utilize it. This would
minimize efforts to avoid the procedure and proceed to litigation, whether the
procedure is mandatory or voluntary. In addition, the eµiployees may utilize
the procedure in lieu of filing an EEOC charge, which could be litigated by
the agency despite the arbitration agre~ment. Thus, the employer may avoid
both the time· and effort required to respond to EEOC charges and the
potential for EEOC litigation. The union's involvement in negotiation may
encourage courts to enforce the procedure because waiver of the judicial
forum may be considered more knowing and voluntary, and the protections
of the union may be deemed to make the process fairer to the employee.237
While the employer could not lawfully conditi9p. employment on the
employee's agreement not to file grievances over claims that involve
overlapping contractual and statutory issues, an agreement with the union
and the employee providing the employee with a choice of forum, but only

235 Even if it did so, the low unionization rate minimizes the impact and leaves
multitudes of employees and employers free to utilize arbitration. And even if every
possible private sector employer was unionized, mi11ions of supervisors and managers
would sti11 be candidates for arbitration.
236 However, the employer could not insist to impasse that the union agree to a
contract provision authorizing direct dealing on the ·arbitration procedure. See Toledo
Typographical Union No. 63 v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1220, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
237 Cj Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), (holding that
employees who do not "knowingly'' agree cannot be required to submit Title VII claims
to arbitration); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phi11ips, 173 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir. 1999)
(invalidating agreement to arbitrate because of unfairness of employer-imposed
procedures).
·
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one forum, might well be enforced.238 The employer could thereby confine
the employee to one forum, eliminating two bites at the apple that otherwise
would remain available to the employee in the unionized workplace because
of the overlap of contractual and statutory claims.239
Thus, rather than bypassing the union and risking litigation, employers
should attempt to negotiate arbitration agreements with the union. If it is
advantageous to both parties, an agreement will be reached which may
benefit all concerned.

VII. CONCLUSION
With the increase in legislation relating to individual employees in recent
years, there has been a corresponding rise in situations in which individual
rights and collective rights intersect in the workplace. Accommodating
collective interests and individual interests, and the NLRA and other statutes,
is a continuing process. The requisite accommodation is best served here by
providing for a union role in negotiating any statutory arbitration process,
while barring the employer from forcing statutory arbitration on the
employees, either through the union or individually. This approach preserves
the benefits of arbitration where they exist, while providing protection from
employer overreaching to avoid the obligations imposed by statutes enacted
to protect employee rights. Employees who have chosen union representation
retain the benefits of that representation and do not sacrifice other rights as a
result of that choice. The employer also may benefit from this approach
through negotiation of an arbitration procedure that is utilized as an
alternative to litigation and survives judicial challenge. In this way arbitration
can serve its intended purpose-to provide a low cost, speedy, and efficient
dispute resolution method for all parties.

238 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
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